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Introduction 
 
In the wake of Labour’s euphoric victory in the 1984 
General Election, two conferences were swiftly organised by 
the new Government.  The first was an economic summit that 
took place in September of that year.  It sought to proclaim a 
new period of prosperity for the country – one which would be 
achieved primarily by means of an extensive liberalisation of 
the economy.   
The following month, the Hui Taumata was convened by 
the Minister of Maori Affairs, Koro Wetere.  It was a summit of 
Maori leaders that its organisers hoped would herald a period 
of vigorous and substantial progress for Maori.  Not since the 
height of the Kotahitanga movement in the 1890s had so many 
hapu and iwi representatives gathered together with the intent 
to foster Maori development in such a concerted manner.  The 
overriding emphasis of the 1984 Hui Taumata was on the need 
for significantly increased Maori access to and management of 
resources.  Maori – according to Prime Minister David Lange at 
the opening of the Hui – were to be the authors of their own 
subsequent development.1 
This emphasis on greater Maori self-determination and 
development, though, was not merely a spontaneous gesture 
on behalf of the Government.  It was as much a reaction to the 
culmination of forces for change that had been building up for 
at least a decade. Its immediate paternity included the rise of 
activist groups such as Nga Tamatoa in the early 1970s, 
increased Maori politicisation in general, the inception of the 
Waitangi Tribunal in 1975, a growing Maori population, and 
the emergence of a strong and articulate Maori intelligentsia.  
These ingredients formed a potent concoction that any 
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Government would have had to confront at some point in the 
near future. 
The Hui Taumata undoubtedly became one of the peaks in 
the landscape of twentieth-century Maori development.  In the 
ensuing two decades, however, the optimism of the Hui was 
balanced out by an almost equal measure of disappointment 
as the aspirations of 1984 failed to materialise in many 
instances.  
This chapter explores the twenty years since 1984, with a 
focus on the experiences of Maori  society during that time.  
Historical periods, however, are arbitrary divisions, as 
societies are explicable by nothing less than their entire 
history.2  Therefore, what is offered here is primarily an 
impressionistic survey of these two decades.   The material is 
arranged under three broad timeframes, which correspond 
with the three Governments that presided over the country 
during this period.  To begin with, though, it is useful to 
consider the state of Maori society at the commencement of 
this era. 
 
 
Maori in 1984: A Snapshot 
 
The communiqué issued by the Economic Summit in 1984 
painted a fairly gloomy picture of the condition of Maori society 
at that time.  It concluded bluntly that ‘…the position of Maori 
is of major concern.  The gap between Maori and Pakeha is 
widening.  Racial tension has been growing and many Maori 
young people have been alienated from the wider community.  
Maori people and their resources continue to be under-utilised 
and under-developed’.3  While this assessment may have been 
overly pessimistic, an assembly of statistics from the period 
reveals that the arithmetic of disparity between Maori and 
non-Maori was certainly pronounced in many key areas. 
By 1984, the Maori population had just nudged over 
400,000, out of a total New Zealand population of 3.25 million.  
Maori life expectancy, though, was seven years less on average 
than for non-Maori, Maori infant mortality rates were at 18.4 
per 1,000, compared with 10.7 per 1,000 for the rest of the 
population, and in the age-group 25 to 64 years, Maori 
unemployment was at least 70 per cent higher than for non-
Maori.4 
Although Maori made up just twelve per cent of the 
population at this time, half of the people languishing in 
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prisons were Maori, Maori admission rates to psychiatric care 
were substantially higher than for any other ethnic group in 
the country,5 and Maori youth suicides accounted for 27 per 
cent of all youth suicides in the country.6   
At the same time, te Reo Maori was in serious decline,7 
there were practically no Maori broadcasting services,8 and few 
specifically Maori health organisations were in operation.9  
Maori were more likely than non-Maori to leave school without 
a qualification, and to have lower median incomes.  And while 
73 per cent of non-Maori owned their own homes in 1984, 
Maori home ownership was just 45 per cent.10 
To a considerable extent, this parade of miserable 
statistics had its antecedents in one-and-a-half centuries of 
European colonisation, in all its permutations.  For decades, 
instead of offering an outstretched hand to Maori, the 
machinery of the state seemed to be presenting a clenched fist 
when it came to providing assistance for Maori development.  
The figures had become so disparate for Maori and non-Maori 
by 1984 that they presented an image of two New Zealands – 
bound by geography, but separated by almost every other 
criterion.  While previous Governments had tended to be 
defensive about this, though, and quick to deflect blame, the 
ebullient Lange regime promised a Maori cultural and 
economic renaissance11 – one that would be achieved, in large 
part, by Maori society anchoring itself to the planned-for 
economic recovery.12 
 
 
1984-1989 
 
Labour’s self-assured commitment to its economic reform 
programme between 1984 and 198713 camouflaged the 
complicated, temperamental, and sometimes perilous nature 
of economic transformation.  As with practically all outbursts 
of economic reform, the greater the rate of change, the greater 
the number of social casualties.14  The liberalisation of the 
country’s economy, commencing in the mid-1980s, may have 
aimed to reduce unemployment, raise living standards, and 
boost New Zealand’s aggregate economic performance,15 but in 
many instances, it was communities with predominantly Maori 
populations that bore the brunt of these changes. 
In several locations around the country, the closure of 
industries such as the freezing works – often without any 
warning16 – resulted in thousands of job losses,17 and the 
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rupturing of entire communities.  Many of these single-
industry areas had a high proportion of Maori living in them.18  
Meanwhile, the almost unbridled access by foreign producers 
to New Zealand’s domestic markets ravaged the local 
manufacturing sector, again hitting Maori harder than non-
Maori.19  For the majority of the Maori workforce – who fell into 
the category of semi-skilled or unskilled labour20 – these 
changes left them and their communities particularly 
vulnerable to severe social disruption.21  Growing inequality in 
income distribution followed during the next decade, and with 
it came the scourge of greater poverty22 and what became 
known as ‘social exclusion’.23  Once more, Maori were 
disproportionately represented in these categories,24 although 
they were certainly not alone in feeling the effects of the 
tectonic shifts taking place in the economy. 
Maori society as a whole may have been down, but it was 
certainly not beaten.  Against this seemingly bleak backdrop, 
flickers of a cultural resuscitation could be seen.  This return 
from the brink was underscored by two principal 
characteristics: it was driven predominantly by ‘flax-roots’ 
Maori – unencumbered by the strictures of officialdom; and it 
was rooted in the desire to nurture te Reo Maori for a new 
generation of speakers. The emphasis on the language was 
deliberate – having been identified as the cornerstone of Maori 
culture, development, and identity.25 
Much of the groundwork for te Reo’s recovery had been 
done earlier in the decade, during the embryonic stages of the 
Kohanga Reo movement – a pre-school regime immersed in the 
Maori language.  By the end of the 1980s, the promoters of 
Kohanga Reo and Kura Kaupapa Maori26 – its school 
successor – had proven to be the heroes of a bourgeoning 
Maori cultural and social revival.  The growth of the Maori pre-
school movement was staggering, reaching 416 kohanga 
throughout the country in 1985,27 and peaking at 765 by 
1996.28  Initially, though, the Department of Maori Affairs had 
only funded a handful of Kohanga, with the first major burst 
of expansion being driven, and to a large extent funded, by 
Maori communities themselves.29 
Despite different ways of defining the number of Maori 
language speakers in the country,30 the statistics reveal that te 
Reo Maori seems to have been saved – almost at the last 
moment – from disappearing.31  What makes this achievement 
even more remarkable is that only in the latter part of the 
decade did the Government finally weigh in with some limited 
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support.  The passage of the Maori Language Act in 1987, 
which made te Reo Maori an official language of the country, 
the establishment of the Maori Language Commission the 
same year, and the formal recognition of Kura Kaupapa Maori 
and wananga (Maori tertiary institutions) in the 1989 
Education Amendment Act no doubt aided the recovery of the 
language.32  However, without the critical initial impetus from 
Maori communities, it is difficult to see how these legislative 
responses would ever have come about. 
By the 1980s, the majority of the Maori population had 
been urbanised for at least a generation.33   The consequent 
intermingling of Maori from different hapu and iwi in an urban 
setting gave rise to a new form of Maori organisation – one 
based on the current geographical location of Maori, and not 
their tribal affiliation.  Far from threatening traditional iwi 
allegiances, however, these urban Maori bodies complemented 
them – responding to needs that were either specific or more 
prominent to the urban environment.34  Organisations such as 
Te Whanau o Waipareira Trust rapidly seized opportunities in 
the second half of the 1980s, and beyond, to expand the scope 
and depth of its activities.  For some, these urban Maori 
authorities were the prototype of a new form of de facto tribal 
establishment.  For others, they were simply an extension of 
that vein in Maori society that was endlessly adaptable to 
changes in the environment.35  
Also sensing new demands emerging around them, many 
tribal-based Maori organisations coalesced into the Federation 
of Maori Authorities in 1987,36 the purpose of which was to 
assist primarily with the economic development of its 
membership.37  In hindsight, it may hardly seem like a 
pioneering venture, but at the time, it was an important 
advance on anything that had existed beforehand, and like 
other Maori initiatives in this period, was the product of 
impulses from within Maori society. 
If Maori society had been ill for most of the century, events 
during the second half of the 1980s breathed new life into the 
patient.  Not only were the Maori language and economy being 
revitalised by Maori themselves (more so than by paternalist 
Government intervention), there was also a new virility in 
Maori cultural expression.  The seminal exhibition ‘Te Maori’, 
which toured the United States between 1984 and 1986, was 
of towering importance in its own right, but to some extent it 
suggested that the successes of Maori culture lay in the past, 
and bypassed a new age of Maori cultural achievement that 
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was beckoning.  Maori writers such as Witi Ihimaera, Patricia 
Grace, and Keri Hulme were coming to greater prominence 
during the 1980s, as were Maori artists like Robyn Kahukiwa, 
Ralph Hotere, Kura Te Waru Rewiri, Shona Rapira-Davies, and 
Cliff Whiting.   
The imprint of Maori in the country’s cultural terrain was 
indisputably becoming far more crisp during this time.  As a 
corollary to all these social, organisational, and cultural 
advances a transformation was about to occur in the way the 
Government dealt with breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
By 1985, the Waitangi Tribunal had been operating for ten 
years, serving as an ongoing commission of inquiry38 into 
Crown breaches of the Treaty since the passage of the Treaty 
of Waitangi Act 1975.  Partly as a concession to its Maori 
constituents, and partly in an effort to expand the ‘arena of 
catharsis’39 which the Tribunal seemed to offer, in 1985, the 
Labour Government amended the Act to extend the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction back to 1840.40  This represented a convenient 
marriage between Government’s preparedness to confront its 
Treaty obligations, and the immutable urge of many Maori 
communities to seek redress for grievances that had existed 
like an abscess, scarring their development often for 
generations. 
Faced with the prospect of finally bringing these grievances 
out into the open, throughout the country, the organisational 
apparatus of hapu and iwi began to clank into action.  
Numerous Maori communities now began to excavate the rich 
quarry of their own history.  By December 1987, 140 claims 
had been lodged with the Tribunal.41  For most of these 
claimant groups, the settlement of their grievances was still 
years away, but there was an immediate benefit in the claims 
process.  As hapu and iwi started to investigate their past – 
particularly bringing into the public domain a previously 
untapped seam of oral history – a renewed sense of identity 
was starting to galvanise many Maori individuals and 
communities.42  
In addition to the growing number of claims being 
researched and reported on by the Tribunal, new scholarship 
on the Treaty was now being fed into the public domain.  
Claudia Orange’s The Treaty of Waitangi,43 published in 1987, 
and Sir Hugh Kawharu’s edited collection of essays, Waitangi: 
Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi,44 
issued two years later, both made important contributions to 
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the understanding of the Treaty’s history, current role, and 
implications for the country. 
 
 
The 1990s 
 
In the six years since 1984, the tangible importance of the 
Treaty for Maori society had expanded greatly; but what about 
the rest of the country?  The view of non-Maori towards the 
Treaty was mixed, but in general terms, it seemed to be one of 
disaffection, periodically accentuated by the odd scowling 
politician or ill-tempered commentator.  Worse still, non-Maori 
antagonism over the Treaty sometimes shielded a deeper 
intolerance and prejudice aimed directly at Maori society.   
To commemorate the inelegantly-titled sesquicentenary of 
the signing of the Treaty, and to assuage the underlying 
trepidation many non-Maori felt over larger and more 
numerous Treaty claims, 1990 was designated as a year of 
national celebration.  Predictably, perhaps, it turned out to be 
for the most part an exercise in political ornamentation – 
choreographed to cleanse the nation’s conscience as much as 
inform the public of the underlying issues relating to the 
history of the Treaty. The past was re-moulded in an image 
that was palatable to the electorate at large.  There was a re-
enactment of the first signing of the Treaty, a parade of 
dignitaries gave speeches, a plethora of publications was 
produced, a commemorative coin and stamp were issued,45 
regional events were organised throughout the country,46 and 
the Queen visited in February to attend the commemoration. 
While the general public was offered this theatre of the 
Treaty, the real advances for Maori in Treaty issues were 
taking place back-stage in the Tribunal.  Among the prominent 
grievances settled in this decade were the Ngai Tahu claim 
(1991), in which the tribe received a settlement valued at $170 
million,47 the fisheries settlement – known as the Sealord Deal 
(1992) – to which the Government contributed $150 million,48 
and the Tainui Raupatu claim (1995), valued at $170 
million.49 Partly as a result of these settlements, the total 
value of Maori assets in 2001 had grown to $8.99 billion50 – 
almost double the value just four years earlier.51  
Furthermore, there were generic reports issued by the 
Tribunal during this time on matters relating to broadcasting, 
the Maori electoral option, and radio spectrum management, 
among others.52  Moreover, the inclusion of Treaty principles 
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in legislation, which had tentatively begun in the 1980s, was 
quickening.  By the end of 1999, there were references to the 
Treaty in 29 statutes,53 of which eleven contained some 
clauses requiring action in respect of the Treaty.54 
However, the triumphs of the Tribunal were not 
necessarily absolute victories for Maori.  From 1992, most 
Treaty settlements fell under the spectre of the Fiscal 
Envelope.  This was a measure by which the Government set 
aside $1 billion for the resolution of all Treaty claims relating 
to events that took place before September 1992.  Moreover, 
all settlements were to be full and final, with no possibility of 
claimants reviving their grievances with the Crown in the 
future. 
Although the $1 billion cap was later dispensed with, the 
replacement policy was just as barbed.  Claims would be 
settled ostensibly without a prescribed limit, but at a level 
consistent with settlements already concluded: virtually the 
same policy in all but name. 
The underlying sense of injustice over limits to settlement 
amounts was accentuated by the fact that that the payments 
being made by the Crown were only a fraction of the value of 
what was being claimed overall.  In 2003, Professor Margaret 
Mutu estimated that the settlements paid out to that time 
amounted to just 0.06 per cent of what the claims were 
worth.55  Too frequently, claimants were wedged into the 
uncomfortable position of having to accept a tiny portion of 
what they were demonstrably entitled to, rather than cling to 
what they felt was just and miss out on a settlement 
altogether.  Also, while the Maori asset base continued to 
grow, some settlement recipients were encountering challenges 
in establishing how best to manage their newly (re)-acquired 
assets.  Trying to devise a model that would allocate some of 
the benefits of these settlements to the claimant communities, 
while simultaneously attempting to maintain and strengthen 
the value of these assets proved to be a challenging and in 
some cases irreconcilable task.56 
Although it would be wrong to underestimate the 
importance of the major Treaty settlements of the 1990s, there 
were signs that Maori society had come to a fork in the road in 
this decade.  One path led to further Treaty claims, 
negotiations with the Crown, and the faint whiff of settlements 
many years later.  The other path was the route towards 
greater economic development and independence.  Those 
embarking on this latter course carried the hope of others with 
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them.  Increasingly, many Maori were becoming disillusioned 
with the sluggishness of the Tribunal process, and the failure 
to see any direct benefits flowing from the meagre settlements 
when they were finally reached.57  
Maori economic development in the 1990s, on the other 
hand, began to surge ahead in an almost spectacular 
fashion.58  By the end of the decade, Maori exports were worth 
around $650 million per annum, there had been a net gain of 
8,591 jobs for Maori in the preceding nine years, increases in 
Maori education and training rates were higher than for non-
Maori, and indicators of potential economic innovation ranked 
Maori as being poised for even more rapid development in the 
near future.59   
There were, however, a few bumps along the way.  Between 
1996 and 1997, the reduction between Maori and non-Maori 
in a range of socio-economic indices – which had been evident 
since the beginning of the 1990s, had stalled in some cases 
and begun to widen again in others.60  In the twelve months 
from September 1996, Maori unemployment rose from sixteen 
to eighteen per cent, representing an estimated increase of 
5,500 unemployed Maori.61  The annual average household 
income for Maori throughout the decade rose at a slower rate 
than for non-Maori, and in the second half of the decade, there 
was a slight increase in the number of Maori who were 
dependent on benefits as the their primary source of income.62 
Unlike previous decades, though, these short-term 
setbacks were not sufficient, in themselves, to blight the 
preconditions for a Maori economic and social take-off.63  One 
of the underlying reasons for this was that the profile of Maori 
society had undergone a fundamental change in the 1990s.  
The foundations for a recovery had been dug deep, and would 
not easily be shaken.  Education had become one of the main 
tenets of this new phase of development  Between 1994 and 
2000, Maori enrolments in tertiary education rose from 27,000 
to 40,000,64 and by the end of the decade, the highest rates of 
growth in Maori employment were in the highly-skilled and 
then skilled sectors.65  Maori were increasingly becoming 
managers, professionals, and technicians, and their earnings 
were rising accordingly.66  All this appeared to be the 
fulfilment of Apirana Ngata’s hope that Maori would one day 
live ‘…according to the material standards of the Pakeha and 
joining with him in the work of the country’.67 
One other development deserves recognition at this 
juncture, and that is the specific form of the politicisation of 
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Maori society that was occurring.  This assumed two main 
forms in the 1990s: the revival of the protest movement, and a 
greater Maori presence in Parliament. 
The introduction of the Fiscal Envelope policy by the 
National Government, coupled with mounting general 
concerns over land and Treaty issues, manifested itself in a 
range of Maori protest activity in the 1990s that had not been 
seen since the mid-1970s.  The Moutoa Gardens in Wanganui 
were occupied in 1995 by a branch of the local iwi claiming 
ownership rights,68 hui were organised around the country to 
give vent to anger over the Fiscal Envelope policy, the Takahue 
School in Northland was occupied by Maori protesters, as was 
the disused Tamaki Girls College in Auckland, and there was a 
series of attacks on supposed symbols of British colonialism, 
including various Victorian-era statues and the lone pine on 
Auckland’s One Tree Hill. 
Changes were also occurring for Maori in Parliament.  
From 1868, when the first four Maori were elected to 
Parliament – representing the Maori seats that were 
established by legislation the previous year69 – the Maori 
presence in the House of Representatives stagnated, and 
eventually became less significant as the number of general 
seats rose. In 1996, following the introduction of the MMP 
(Mixed Member Proportional) system of voting,70 there was an 
increase to five Maori seats in the House, followed by a further 
rise to seven in 2002.  The growth in the number of Maori MPs 
– both in Maori and general seats71 – led to new political 
arrangements flowering.  In 1991, Mana Motuhake, which had 
battled since 1980 for the promotion of greater Maori 
autonomy,72 merged with the Alliance Party, and its first MP, 
Sandra Lee, was elected to Parliament in 1993.   After the 
2002 General election, there were a total of twenty Maori 
serving as MPs.73 
Bigger shake-ups were ahead though.  Following the 1996 
General Election, the National and New Zealand First parties 
formed a coalition Government.  In a surprising result, New 
Zealand First had succeeded in seizing all the five Maori seats 
from Labour.  It seemed to have become a de facto Maori 
party, making it an unfamiliar and uncomfortable bed-fellow 
for the centre-right National party.  However, when this 
coalition collapsed in August 1998, New Zealand First 
unravelled.  Out of the debris, two essentially new parties were 
strung together.  One was a rump New Zealand First, and the 
other was an attempt ostensibly at a Maori and Polynesian 
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party – Mauri Pacific – which was made up of the Maori ex-
New Zealand First MPs in Parliament. 
Following a series of high-profile disclosures about the 
activities of some of the MPs in Mauri Pacific, the party 
cobbled together a minuscule 4,008 list votes and 9,321 
candidate votes in the 1999 General Election, and duly self-
destructed soon afterwards.74 
At the heart of this shifting and sorting process in Maori 
Parliamentary politics was a principle that far too few Maori 
politicians were inclined to accept: that Maori were just as 
pluralistic as any other people, and that the presumption that 
there could possibly be a ‘one-size-fits-all’ Maori political party 
appeared to be exactly that – presumptuous. 
 
 
2000 – 2004 
 
From one perspective, a Maori party was an increasingly 
unlikely proposition in the new millennium – simply a relic of 
many earlier failed efforts to achieve Maori political unity.  Yet, 
the allure of such a body acquired an added lustre whenever 
Government policies seemed to be attacking the interests of 
Maori.  It appeared that Maori society evinced its greatest 
unity when it felt it was being besieged.   Exactly this sort of 
collision between hostile Government policy and Maori 
interests took place in 2004, when the Government rushed 
through legislation that vested the country’s foreshore and 
seabed in Crown ownership – contrary to Article the Second of 
the Treaty and Te Turi Whenua Maori Act 1993,75 and 
extinguishing a decision by the Court of Appeal that the Maori 
Land Court had the jurisdiction to investigate customary 
ownership of the foreshore and seabed.76 
There was a surge of Maori solidarity in opposition to the 
proposed legislation, culminating in a 20,000-strong hikoi that 
reached Parliament Buildings on 5 May 2004,77 and the 
formation of a political party geared to advocate for Maori 
interests in Parliament.  The creation of the Maori Party was, 
in one sense, just the most recent manifestation of the spirit of 
kotahitanga that had a pedigree extending back as far as 
1835.  In this sense, the existence of the Party was more about 
a way of looking at the world that is peculiar to Maori than it 
was about the tangle of temporary political interests.  
To some, Maori politics had advanced by the formation of a 
specifically Maori national political organisation, but there was 
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little in the Maori Party that had not been seen in previous 
Maori national political movements.  However, this is not to 
dismiss its contribution.  The frail state of race relations in the 
country had been exposed in the aftermath of a provocative 
speech given by National Leader, Don Brash, at the beginning 
of 2004.  Brash’s talk on the Treaty, and allegedly favourable 
treatment received by Maori78 prompted the Race Relations 
Conciliator, Gregory Fortuin, to say that he was ‘…hearing 
alarm bells’.79  The Maori Party may not have been a salve to 
Brash’s scorching rhetoric, but at least it provided a 
counterpoint to political views that were unsympathetic to 
Maori. 
 
 
Maori in 2004: A Snapshot 
 
Twenty years on, had the profile of Maori society really 
changed in any substantial way, and was the outlook in 2004 
any less pessimistic than it had been in 1984?  Possibly the 
most obvious change in this time had been in the population 
figures.  The number of people in the country identifying 
themselves as Maori had risen over twenty years by around 
210,000, giving a total Maori population in 2004 of 
approximately 610,000.80  The gap in life-expectancy between 
Maori and non-Maori was roughly the same throughout this 
period.  However, for both groups, life expectancy had grown 
by about four years in the two decades from 1984.81  
The number of Maori leaving the education system with no 
qualifications had plummeted drastically during this time.  
Whereas in 1986, the figure had been close to 70 per cent, by 
2003, it was below 40 per cent.  Similarly, in the category of 
school and post-school qualification attainment, 24 per cent of 
Maori achieved a qualification in 2003, compared to just nine 
per cent in 1986.82  But the most impressive educational 
achievements for Maori lay in the tertiary sector.  85,000 
Maori were enrolled in the public tertiary sector in 2003, 
compared with just 27,000 a decade earlier.83   This increase 
was complemented by the rise in the number of Maori 
industry trainees, from 10,600 in December 2000 to 16,400 by 
June 2004.84  
The gulf between rates of unemployment between Maori 
and non-Maori had widened in this period.  In March 2004, 
Maori unemployment was just over nine per cent, while the 
non-Maori rate was almost a third of that figure.85   However, 
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the type of employment Maori were acquiring mitigated these 
figures to some extent.  Between 1992 and 2003, there was an 
almost 120 per cent growth in the number of Maori in highly-
skilled employment86 
The one achievement that really illuminated the extent of 
the Maori renaissance since 1984 was the revival of te Reo 
Maori.  Largely through the energetic and resourceful efforts of 
both Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Maori – the Maori Language 
Commission – and the persistent and often enterprising 
endeavours of several Maori communities throughout the 
country, the almost terminal decline of the Maori language by 
1984 had not only been halted, but reversed.  Moreover, gains 
in the language were spreading into mainstream New Zealand 
culture and society87 in a fashion that only the most optimistic 
would have conceived of two decades earlier. 
Another conspicuous area of progress was Maori 
Broadcasting, which by 2004 included several local Maori 
radio stations, and a national Maori television station88 that in 
turn was helping to sustain a flourishing Maori media 
production sector.89  Although in its early stages, the link 
between the existence of Maori television and the maintenance 
of te Reo Maori was made an explicit outcome for the station,90 
and augured well for the language’s survival into the 
foreseeable future. 
In the health field, Maori had a presence on all regional 
health boards,91 traditional Maori healing was gaining 
currency among Maori, non-Maori, and even the health 
profession,92 and by 2004, there were 240 Maori health 
providers in the country, all of which operated under a 
specifically Maori kaupapa to provide more relevant health and 
disability services predominantly to a Maori clientele.93 
On the negative side of the ledger, while Maori made up 
fifteen per cent of the country’s total population in 200494 (up 
from twelve per cent in 1984), Maori youth suicide was at 
around 26 per cent of all youth suicide – virtually unchanged 
in twenty years.95 Similarly, Maori prison incarceration rates 
remained almost the same as they had been in 1984,96 Maori 
home ownership had increased, but still lagged behind those 
rates for non-Maori,97 and Maori incomes continued to be 
lower than for most other ethnic groups in the country.98 
While overall, the inequalities between Maori and non-
Maori were less glaringly obvious in 2004 than they had been 
at the time of the first Hui Taumata, this in no way excused 
the fact that they still existed.  Buried beneath twenty years of 
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Government reports, meetings, speeches, policies, and 
research was little for any administration during this period to 
be proud of.  The ethnic fault line separating Maori from non-
Maori was still jutting out in so many areas.  And yet, 
advances in Maori society had been made since 1984.  
How did such a seemingly unresponsive official climate 
allow for so many instances of progress in Maori society to 
transpire?  The answer is that where real improvements were 
occurring, Maori communities were often found to be at their 
core – coming up with plans, engineering policies, stitching 
together resources, and pursuing ideas with the sort of 
commitment and creativity that high-handed Government 
departments could follow (sometimes with a dose of goodwill), 
but never really match.  Perhaps this was the real key to the 
successful evolution of Maori society in the two decades after 
1984: a sort of self-fertilising development, achieved as much 
in spite of Government assistance as because of it.  It was 
Maori communities and a reinvigorated Maori leadership that 
defined the kaupapa for this development and that led the 
charge from the front.  This, then, was where the epicentre of 
the Maori renaissance was located. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The buoyant expectations of the 1984 Hui Taumata did 
not quite come to fruition in the way its participants may have 
hoped for.  Indeed, in retrospect, it would have been naïve to 
expect anything else.  The burden of over a century of 
disadvantage and discrimination proved too difficult to 
dislodge in so short a time.  Moreover, beneath the grand 
aspirations for improvement was a fatal lack of detail on the 
mechanics of how these ideas would be brought about.  
However, the Hui did mobilise and give voice to a will in Maori 
society to overcome the myriad hurdles strewn in front of it.  
This, in turn, set the general tone for the paradigm of Maori 
development during the next twenty years. 
By 2004, examples of Maori achievement had become as 
varied as they were numerous.  In education, industry, 
government, the arts, and a host of other fields, the presence 
of successful Maori was first anticipated, then expected, and 
then finally, accepted as the norm.  As Maori explored new 
tributaries of development, the profile and perception of Maori 
society began to evolve.  With a higher proportion of Maori 
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university graduates than ever before, greater recognition of 
Treaty issues, both in legislation and in the public arena, more 
te Reo speakers than at any other time in living memory, and 
a stronger Maori political voice in the country, overall, Maori 
society was in a healthier state in 2004 than it had been for 
generations, and was primed for even greater achievements in 
the future. 
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